Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers
Creation-Date: 2000-03-22
Number: 00-019/1
Author-Name: Maarten C.W. Janssen
Author-Email: janssen@few.eur.nl
Author-Workplace-Name: Erasmus University Rotterdam
Title: Imitation of Cooperation in Prisoner's Dilemma Games with Some Local Interaction
Abstract: In this paper I study conditions for the emergence of cooperativebehavior in a dynamic model of population interaction.The model has finitely many individuals located on a circle. The pay-off of each individual is partly based on the (local)interaction with neighbors and partly on (uniform) interaction withthe whole population. The dynamics is driven byimitative behavior. I show that for a large class of parameterscooperation will emerge if the population is large; if thepopulation is small, defection will prevail in the long run. Theresult contrasts with conventional wisdom which says that thelarger the population, the less likely cooperation will be.
Classification-JEL: C72; D62
Keywords: Cooperation; Prisoner's Dilemma; Evolutionary Game Theory; Local Interaction
File-Url: https://papers.tinbergen.nl/00019.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 217661 bytes
Handle: RePEc:tin:wpaper:20000019