Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers
Creation-Date: 2001-01-17
Number: 01-008/3
Author-Name: Paul Frijters
Author-Email: pfrijters@feweb.vu.nl
Author-Workplace-Name: Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
Author-Name: Alexander F. Tieman
Author-Email: a.f.tieman@dnb.nl
Author-Workplace-Name: Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
Title: The Pre-commitment Advantage of Having a Slow Legislative System
Abstract: In this paper it is argued that the slowness of the legislativesystem implies pre-commitment of legislation for at least the periodit takes to change a law. A simple model illustrates the benefit ofthis pre-commitment.
Classification-JEL: D70; E61; F41; K40
Keywords: time-inconsistency; legislation; irreversible investments
File-Url: https://papers.tinbergen.nl/01008.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 703170 bytes
Handle: RePEc:tin:wpaper:20010008