Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers Creation-Date: 2001-07-17 Number: 01-068/1 Author-Name: Matthijs van Veelen Author-Email: veelen@tinbergen.nl Author-Workplace-Name: Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam Title: Evolution in Games with a Continuous Action Space Abstract: This discussion paper resulted in a publication in 'Economic Theory', 2009, 39(3), 355-376. Allowing for games with a continuous action space, we deal with the question whether and when static conceptslike evolutionary stability can shed any light on what happens in the dynamical context of a population playingthese games. The continuous equivalents of theorems for the finite case are either harder to prove or simplyuntrue. In some cases that fall within the latter category, sensible additional assumptions can repair the damage.Apart from that it turns out that we can no longer ignore the mutation process; with a continuous action space itmakes quite a difference what kind of shocks we consider to be likely. Classification-JEL: C70 Keywords: Evolutionary stability, Uniform invasion barrier, Local superiority, Asymptotic stability, Continuous action space, topology File-Url: https://papers.tinbergen.nl/01068.pdf File-Format: application/pdf File-Size: 369370 bytes Handle: RePEc:tin:wpaper:20010068