Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers
Creation-Date: 2002-01-22
Revision-Date: 2002-12-03
Number: 02-006/1
Author-Name: Otto H. Swank
Author-Email: swank@few.eur.nl
Author-Workplace-Name: Erasmus University Rotterdam and Tinbergen Institute
Author-Name: Phongthorn Wrasai
Author-Email: pwrasai@few.eur.nl
Author-Workplace-Name: Erasmus University Rotterdam and Tinbergen Institute
Title: Deliberation, Information Aggregation and Collective Decision Making
Abstract: We study a model of collective decision making with endogenous information collection.Agents collect information about the consequences of a project, communicate, and then vote onthe project. We examine under what conditions communication may increase the probability thatgood decisions are made. Our most surprising result is that when there are no direct cost ofcommunication and communication can only help to identify the truth, more communication may reducethe probability that a correct decision is made. The reason for this result is that communicationmay aggravate the free-rider problem associated with collecting information.
Classification-JEL: D78; D83
Keywords: Uncertainty; Deliberation; Learning; Collective decision making
File-Url: https://papers.tinbergen.nl/02006.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 278863 bytes
Handle: RePEc:tin:wpaper:20020006