Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers
Creation-Date: 2003-01-23
Number: 03-008/2
Author-Name: Jeroen Hinloopen
Author-Email: j.hinloopen@uva.nl
Author-Workplace-Name: Faculty of Economics and Econometrics, University of Amsterdam
Title: Cartel Stability with Subjective Detection Beliefs
Abstract: The condition is derived for Friedman 's trigger strategy to sustaina collusive market equilibrium as a noncooperative Nash equilibriumgiven subjective beliefs as to the antitrust authority's ability of suc-cesfully dissolving the illegal cartel.
Classification-JEL: L12; L41.
Keywords: Cartel stability; trigger strategy; subjective beliefs.
File-Url: https://papers.tinbergen.nl/03008.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 185570 bytes
Handle: RePEc:tin:wpaper:20030008