Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers
Creation-Date: 2003-06-18
Number: 03-055/1
Author-Name: Simon Gächter
Author-Email: simon.gaechter@unisg.ch
Author-Workplace-Name: CESifo, and University of St Gallen
Author-Name: Arno Riedl
Author-Email: a.m.riedl@uva.nl
Author-Workplace-Name: Faculty of Economics and Econometrics, University of Amsterdam
Title: Moral Property Rights in Bargaining with Infeasible Claims
Abstract: In many business transactions, in labor-management relations, in internationalconflicts, and welfare state reforms bargainers hold strong entitlements that are oftengenerated by claims that are not feasible any more. These entitlements seem to considerablyshape negotiation behavior. By using the novel setup of a 'bargaining with claims' experimentwe provide new systematic evidence tracking the influence of entitlements and obligationsthrough the whole bargaining process. We find strong entitlement effects that shape openingoffers, bargaining duration, concessions and reached (dis-)agreements. We argue thatentitlements constitute a 'moral property right' that is influential independent ofnegotiators' legal property rights.
Classification-JEL: A12; D63; C78; C92
Keywords: Moral property rights; fairness judgments; bargaining with claims; self-serving bias
File-Url: https://papers.tinbergen.nl/03055.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 345706 bytes
Handle: RePEc:tin:wpaper:20030055