Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers Creation-Date: 2003-08-27 Number: 03-067/1 Author-Name: Otto H. Swank Author-Email: swank@few.eur.nl Author-Workplace-Name: Faculty of Economics, Erasmus University Rotterdam Author-Name: Bauke Visser Author-Email: bvisser@few.eur.nl Author-Workplace-Name: Faculty of Economics, Erasmus University Rotterdam Title: Do Elections lead to Informed Public Decisions? Abstract: This discussion paper led to a publication in 'Public Choice', 129, 435-460.

Democracies delegate substantial decision power to politicians. Using a model in which an incumbent can design, examine and implement public policies, we show that examination takes place in spite of, rather than thanks to, elections. Elections are needed as a carrot and a stick to motivate politicians, yet politicians who are overly interested in re-election shy away from policy examination. Our analysis sheds light on the distance created in mature democracies between the political process and the production of policy relevant information; on the role played by probing into candidates' past; and on the possibility of crowding out desirable political behaviour by increasing the value of holding office. Classification-JEL: D72; D78; D83 Keywords: Democracy; Media; Policy Examination; Multiple Tasks; Information; Elections File-Url: https://papers.tinbergen.nl/03067.pdf File-Format: application/pdf File-Size: 429012 bytes Handle: RePEc:tin:wpaper:20030067