Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers
Creation-Date: 2004-01-22
Number: 04-013/3
Author-Name: Amitrajeet A. Batabyal
Author-Email: aabgsh@rit.edu
Author-Workplace-Name: Department of Economics, Rochester Institute of Technology, New York, USA
Author-Name: Peter Nijkamp
Author-Email: pnijkamp@feweb.vu.nl
Author-Workplace-Name: Department of Spatial Economics, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
Title: Favoritism in the Public Provision of Goods in Developing Countries
Abstract: Goods are often allocated publically by means of queuing processes in developing countries.In such situations, which group of citizens should a corrupt government official favor? In addition,what should be the basis for this favoritism? To the best of our knowledge, these salient questionshave received scant attention in the literature. Consequently, we use queuing theory to firstdemonstrate that when allocating goods publically, a case can be made for favoring a particular groupof citizens. Next, we show that the nature of this favoritism depends not only on the bribes receivedby the corrupt government official but also on the efficiency with which this official discharges hisduties.
Classification-JEL: D80; H40; O12
Keywords: Bribery; Corruption; Favoritism; Queuing Theory; Wait Time
File-Url: https://papers.tinbergen.nl/04013.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 161094 bytes
Handle: RePEc:tin:wpaper:20040013