Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers
Creation-Date: 2004-03-02
Number: 04-028/1
Author-Name: Vitaly Pruzhansky
Author-Email: pruzhansky@tinbergen.nl
Author-Workplace-Name: Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
Title: A Discussion of Maximin
Abstract: This paper builds on one of the results of Pruzhansky [22], namely that maximin strategies guarantee the same expected payoffs as mixed Nash equilibrium strategies in bimatrix games. We present a discussion on the applicability of maximin strategies in such class of games. The usefulness of maximin is illustrated from both positive and normative viewpoints. Examples are provided.
Classification-JEL: C72
Keywords: Bounded rationality; common knowledge of rationality; correlated equilibria; rationalizability; uncertainty aversion
File-Url: https://papers.tinbergen.nl/04028.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 331811 bytes
Handle: RePEc:tin:wpaper:20040028