Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers
Creation-Date: 2004-11-10
Number: 04-121/1
Author-Name: Gerard van der Laan
Author-Email: glaan@feweb.vu.nl
Author-Workplace-Name: Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
Author-Name: Vitaly Pruzhansky
Author-Email: pruzhansky@tinbergen.nl
Author-Workplace-Name: Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
Title: Demand Adjustment in Coalitional Games
Abstract: This paper associates a strategic n-person game with a given transferable utility game and studies its Nash equilibria. Strict equilibria in this model characterize those divisions of social surplus that can become conventions in the sense of Young (1993). It is shown that even in relatively simple games various inefficiencies can arise.
Classification-JEL: C70
Keywords: Aspirations; bargaining set; core; von Neumann-Morgenstern vector; stable set
File-Url: https://papers.tinbergen.nl/04121.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 1168051 bytes
Handle: RePEc:tin:wpaper:20040121