Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers Creation-Date: 2004-12-16 Number: 04-136/1 Author-Name: René van den Brink Author-Email: jrbrink@feweb.vu.nl Author-Workplace-Name: Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam Author-Name: Yukihiko Funaki Author-Email: funaki@waseda.jp Author-Workplace-Name: School of Political Science and Economics, Waseda University, Tokyo Title: Axiomatizations of a Class of Equal Surplus Sharing Solutions for Cooperative Games with Transferable Utility Abstract: See also the publication in 'Theory and Decision', 2009, 67, 303-340. A situation in which a finite set of players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game. A one-point solution for TU-games assigns a payoff distribution to every TU-game. In this paper we discuss a class of solutions containing all convex combinations of the CIS-value, the ENSC-value, and the egalitarian solution. We characterize this class of solutions using a general standardness for two player games and reduced game consistency. Specific cases of these properties characterize specific solutions in this class. Classification-JEL: C71 Keywords: TU-game; Equal surplus sharing; CIS-value; ENSC-value; Egalitarian solution; Reduced Game Consistency File-Url: https://papers.tinbergen.nl/04136.pdf File-Format: application/pdf File-Size: 1022057 bytes Handle: RePEc:tin:wpaper:20040136