Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers
Creation-Date: 2005-03-22
Number: 05-031/2
Author-Name: Silvia Caserta
Author-Email: caserta@few.eur.nl
Author-Workplace-Name: Faculty of Economics, Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam
Author-Name: Casper G. de Vries
Author-Email: cdevries@few.eur.nl
Author-Workplace-Name: Faculty of Economics, Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam
Title: Auctions with Numerous Bidders
Abstract: We study auctions in which the number of potential bidders is large, such as in Internet auctions. With numerous bidders, the expected revenue and the optimal bid function in a first price auction result in complicated expressions, except for a few simple distribution function for the bidders' valuations. We show that these expressions can be well approximated using extreme value theory without assuming a particular distribution function. The theory is applied to data from Internet auctions.
Classification-JEL: D44
Keywords: Auctions; Numerous bidders; Extreme values; Internet auctions
File-Url: https://papers.tinbergen.nl/05031.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 343058 bytes
Handle: RePEc:tin:wpaper:20050031