Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers
Creation-Date: 2005-04-06
Number: 05-034/1
Author-Name: Vjollca Sadiraj
Author-Email: vsadiraj@econlab.arizona.edu
Author-Workplace-Name: Economic Science Laboratory, University of Arizona, Tucson, USA
Author-Name: Jan Tuinstra
Author-Email: j.tuinstra@uva.nl
Author-Workplace-Name: CeNDEF, Faculty of Economics and Econometrics, Universiteit van Amsterdam
Author-Name: Frans van Winden
Author-Email: f.a.a.m.vanwinden@uva.nl
Author-Workplace-Name: CREED, Faculty of Economics and Econometrics, Universiteit van Amsterdam
Title: On the Size of the Winning Set in the Presence of Interest Groups
Abstract: Interest groups are introduced in a spatial model of electoral competition between two political parties. We show that the presence of these interest groups increases the winning set, which is the set of policy platforms for the challenger that will defeat the incumbent. Therefore interest groups enhance the probability of the challenger winning the election.
Classification-JEL: D71; D72
Keywords: Spatial voting models; electoral competition; winning set; interest groups.
File-Url: https://papers.tinbergen.nl/05034.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 286493 bytes
Handle: RePEc:tin:wpaper:20050034