Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers
Creation-Date: 2005-06-01
Number: 05-058/1
Author-Name: Stefano Ficco
Author-Email: ficco@few.eur.nl
Author-Workplace-Name: Faculty of Economics, Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam
Author-Name: Vladimir Karamychev
Author-Email: karamychev@few.eur.nl
Author-Workplace-Name: Faculty of Economics, Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam
Title: Evaluation Problem versus Selection Problem in Organizational Structures
Abstract: We consider a hierarchical organization with two fully rational agents. The goal of the organization is that of selecting the best alternative out of several available, and agents are heterogenous in the accuracy with which they screen the alternatives. We show that, if internal communications between agents is not possible, the ordering of agents affects the performance of the organization. More specifically, we find that the expected payoff of the organization improves when the more accurate agent screens first. Finally, we note that such optimal ordering makes the hierarchy formally identical to one in which the internal communication flow is perfect.
Classification-JEL: D23; D70; D81
Keywords: Organizations; Imperfect Communication; Selection
File-Url: https://papers.tinbergen.nl/05058.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 205770 bytes
Handle: RePEc:tin:wpaper:20050058