Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers
Creation-Date: 2005-11-14
Number: 05-104/1
Author-Name: Jeroen Hinloopen
Author-Email: j.hinloopen@uva.nl
Author-Workplace-Name: Faculty of Economics and Econometrics, Universiteit van Amsterdam
Title: The Pro-collusive Effect of Increasing the Repose Period for Price Fixing Agreements
Abstract: This discussion paper resulted in the publication <I>The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy</I> (2007), 7(1), 1135.<P>

Intuitively, extending the period of repose for price fixing agreements enhances the effectiveness of competition policy enforcement. This paper proofs this intuition wrong. As extending the repose period reduces cartel members' defection payoff while it leaves unaltered expected compliance profits, it induces cartels to be more stable internally.
Classification-JEL: K21; K42; L12; L41
Keywords: Cartel stability; detection probabilities; statue of limitation.
File-Url: https://papers.tinbergen.nl/05104.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 201537 bytes
Handle: RePEc:tin:wpaper:20050104