Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers
Creation-Date: 2006-01-06
Number: 06-006/2
Author-Name: Joseph Francois
Author-Email: francois@few.eur.nl
Author-Workplace-Name: Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam
Author-Name: Henrik Horn
Author-Email: henrik.horn@iies.su.se
Author-Workplace-Name: IIES, Stockholm
Title: Antitrust in Open Economies
Abstract: We examine antitrust rules in a two county general equilibrium trade model, contrasting national and multilateral (cooperative) determination of competition policy, exploring the properties of the policy equilibrium. It is not imperfect competition, but variation in competitive stance between sectors that matters for trading partners. Beggar-thy-neighbor competition policies relate to countries' comparative advantages, and hurt the factor intensively used, or specific to, the imperfectly competitive sector. They also create a competitive advantage for export firms. FDI can be pro-competitive in this context, reducing the scope for beggar-thy-neighbor policies and reducing the gains from a multilateral competition agreement.
Classification-JEL: L4; F12; F3
Keywords: antitrust; competition policy; merger policy; trade and imperfect competition; FDI
File-Url: https://papers.tinbergen.nl/06006.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 300683 bytes
Handle: RePEc:tin:wpaper:20060006