Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers
Creation-Date: 2007-12-11
Number: 07-096/1
Author-Name: Audrey Hu
Author-Email: x.hu@uva.nl
Author-Workplace-Name: Universiteit van Amsterdam
Author-Name: Liang Zhou
Author-Email: l.zhou@uva.nl
Author-Workplace-Name: Universiteit van Amsterdam
Title: Selecting less Corruptible Bureaucrats
Abstract: A government officials' propensity to corruption, or corruptibility, can be affected by his intertemporal preference over job benefits. Through a dynamic model of rent-seeking behavior, this paper examines how endogenously determined corruptibility changes with monitoring intensity, salary growth, and discount factor for expected future income. The paper illustrates credible circumstances in which the less an official values his job the more he seeks rents. This negative relation suggests a simple quasi-auction mechanism for selecting less corruptible public servants. While straightforward to implement, the quasi-auction also tends to circumvent the corrupt influence that is often associated with standard auction of jobs.
Classification-JEL: D73; H11; D44
Keywords: rent seeking; corruption; selection of officials; quasi-auction; sale of jobs
File-Url: https://papers.tinbergen.nl/07096.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 259344 bytes
Handle: RePEc:tin:wpaper:20070096