Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers
Creation-Date: 2009-07-31
Number: 09-068/1
Author-Name: Matthias Dahm
Author-Email: matthias.dahm@urv.cat
Author-Workplace-Name: Universitat Rovira i Virgili
Author-Name: Robert Dur
Author-Email: dur@ese.eur.nl
Author-Workplace-Name: Erasmus University Rotterdam, CESifo, IZA
Author-Name: Amihai Glazer
Author-Email: aglazer@uci.edu
Author-Workplace-Name: University of California, Irvine
Title: Lobbying of Firms by Voters
Abstract: A firm may induce voters or elected politicians to support a policy it favors by suggesting that it is more likely to invest in a district whose voters or representatives support the policy. In equilibrium, no one vote may be decisive, and the policy may gain strong support though the majority of districts suffer from adoption of the program. When votes reveal information about the district, the firm's implicit promise or threat can be credible.
Classification-JEL: C72, D72, D78
Keywords: Lobbying, voting, special interests, influence
File-Url: https://papers.tinbergen.nl/09068.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 209529 bytes
Handle: RePEc:tin:wpaper:20090068