Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers Creation-Date: 2009-08-04 Revision-Date: 2012-04-20 Number: 09-069/1 Author-Name: Josse Delfgaauw Author-Workplace-Name: Erasmus University Rotterdam Author-Name: Robert Dur Author-Workplace-Name: Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam Author-Name: Joeri Sol Author-Workplace-Name: Erasmus University Rotterdam Author-Name: Willem Verbeke Author-Workplace-Name: Erasmus University Rotterdam Title: Tournament Incentives in the Field: Gender Differences in the Workplace Abstract: This discussion paper has led to a publication in the Journal of Labor Economics, 2013, 32(2), 305-326.

We ran a field experiment in a Dutch retail chain consisting of 128 stores. In a random sample of these stores, we introduced short-term sales competitions among subsets of stores. We find that sales competitions have a large effect on sales growth, but only in stores where the store's manager and a large fraction of the employees have the same gender. Remarkably, results are alike for sales competitions with and without monetary rewards, suggesting a high symbolic value of winning a tournament. Lastly, despite the substantial variation in team size, we find no evidence for free-riding. Classification-JEL: C93, J16, M52 Keywords: field experiment, gender differences, competition, sales contests, awards File-Url: https://papers.tinbergen.nl/09069.pdf File-Format: application/pdf File-Size: 708193 bytes Handle: RePEc:tin:wpaper:20090069