Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers
Creation-Date: 2009-11-13
Number: 09-101/1
Author-Name: Sander Onderstal
Author-Workplace-Name: University of Amsterdam
Author-Name: Arthur Van de Meerendonk
Author-Workplace-Name: Maastricht University
Title: Auctioning Incentive Contracts: An Experimental Study
Abstract: In this note, we experimentally examine the relative performance of price-only auctions and multi-attribute auctions. We do so in procurement settings where the buyer can give the winning bidder incentives to exert effort on non-price dimensions after the auction. Both auctions theoretically implement the surplus maximizing mechanism. Our experiment confirms this result. Moreover, we observe that the “pie” is shared the same in both auctions between buyer and suppliers both in theory and in the lab (after accounting for learning effects).
Classification-JEL: C91, D44, D86
Keywords: Procurement; Price-only auctions; Multi-attribute auctions; Incentive Contracts; Laboratory Experiment
File-Url: https://papers.tinbergen.nl/09101.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 267615 bytes
Handle: RePEc:tin:wpaper:20090101