Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers
Creation-Date: 2010-06-10
Number: 10-056/1
Author-Name: Marco A. Haan
Author-Workplace-Name: University of Groningen
Author-Name: Bart Los
Author-Workplace-Name: University of Groningen
Author-Name: Sander Onderstal
Author-Workplace-Name: University of Amsterdam
Author-Name: Yohanes E. Riyanto
Author-Workplace-Name: Nanyang Technological University Singapore
Title: Punching above One's Weight: The Case against Election Campaigns
Abstract: Politicians differ in their ability to implement some policy. In an election, candidates make commitments regarding the plans they will try to implement if elected. These serve as a signal of true ability. In equilibrium, candidates make overambitious promises. The candidate with the highest ability wins. Yet, the electorate may be better off having a random candidate implement her best plan, rather than seeing the winner implementing an overambitious plan. This is more likely if the ability distribution is skewed toward high values, the number of candidates is high, with private benefits from being elected, or if parties select candidates.
Classification-JEL: D72
Keywords: election promises, signalling
File-Url: https://papers.tinbergen.nl/10056.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 303818 bytes
Handle: RePEc:tin:wpaper:20100056