Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers
Creation-Date: 2010-09-02
Number: 10-090/2
Author-Name: Michael R. Baye
Author-Workplace-Name: Indiana University
Author-Name: Dan Kovenock
Author-Workplace-Name: University of Iowa
Author-Name: Casper G. de Vries
Author-Workplace-Name: Erasmus University Rotterdam
Title: The Herodotus Paradox
Abstract: This discussion paper led to a publication in <A href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825611001151">'Games and Economic Behavior'</A>, 74(1), 399-406. <P>The Babylonian bridal auction, described by Herodotus, is regarded as one of the earliest uses of an auction in history. Yet, to our knowledge, the literature lacks a formal equilibrium analysis of this auction. We provide such an analysis for the twoplayer case with complete and incompete information, and in so doing identify what we call the "Herodotus Paradox".
Classification-JEL: C72, D44
Keywords: second price, transfer to loser
File-Url: https://papers.tinbergen.nl/10090.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 251523 bytes
Handle: RePEc:tin:wpaper:20100090