Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers
Creation-Date: 2011-02-14
Number: 11-036/1
Author-Name: Rene van den Brink
Author-Workplace-Name: VU University Amsterdam
Author-Name: Ilya Katsev
Author-Workplace-Name: Russian Academy of Sciences, St Petersburg
Author-Name: Gerard van der Laan
Author-Workplace-Name: VU University Amsterdam
Title: Games on Union Closed Systems
Abstract: A situation in which a finite set of players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game. A solution for TU-games assigns a set of payoff distributions to every TU-game. In the literature various models of games with restricted cooperation can be found. So, instead of allowing all subsets of the player set N to form, it is assumed that the set of feasible coalitions is a subset of the power set of N. In this paper we consider such sets of feasible coalitions that are closed under union, i.e. for any two feasible coalitions also their union is feasible. Properties of solutions (the core, the nucleolus, the prekernel and the Shapley value) are given for games on union closed systems.
Classification-JEL: C71
Keywords: TU-game, restricted cooperation, union closed system, core, prekernel, nucleolus
File-Url: https://papers.tinbergen.nl/11036.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 251775 bytes
Handle: RePEc:tin:wpaper:20110036