Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers
Creation-Date: 2012-02-09
Number: 12-010/2
Author-Name: Ajay Bhaskarabhatla
Author-Email: bhaskarabhatla@ese.eur.nl
Author-Workplace-Name: Erasmus University Rotterdam
Author-Name: Enrico Pennings
Author-Email: pennings@ese.eur.nl
Author-Workplace-Name: Erasmus University Rotterdam
Title: Defensive Disclosure under Antitrust Enforcement
Abstract: We formulate a simple model of optimal defensive disclosure by a monopolist facing uncertain antitrust enforcement and test its implications using unique data on defensive disclosures and patents by IBM during 1955-1989. Our results indicate that stronger antitrust enforcement leads to more defensive disclosure, that quality inventions are disclosed defensively, and that defensive disclosure served as an alternative but less successful mechanism to patenting at IBM in appropriating returns from R&D.
Classification-JEL: K21, L40, M10, O32, O34
Keywords: Antitrust, Defensive Disclosure, Patent, IBM
File-Url: https://papers.tinbergen.nl/12010.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 225800 bytes
Handle: RePEc:tin:wpaper:20120010