Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers
Creation-Date: 2012-02-10
Number: 12-012/1
Author-Name: Arantza Estévez-Fernández
Author-Workplace-Name: VU University Amsterdam
Author-Name: María Gloria Fiestras-Janeiro
Author-Workplace-Name: Vigo University
Author-Name: Manuel Alfredo Mosquera
Author-Workplace-Name: Vigo University
Author-Name: Estela Sánchez- Rodríguez
Author-Workplace-Name: Vigo University
Title: A Bankruptcy Approach to the Core Cover
Abstract: In this paper we establish a relationship between the core cover of a compromise admissiblegame and the core of a particular bankruptcy game: the core cover of a compromiseadmissible game is, indeed, a translation of the set of coalitional stable allocations capturedby an associated bankruptcy game. Moreover, we analyze the combinatorial complexity ofthe core cover and, consequently, of the core of a compromise stable game.
Classification-JEL: C71
Keywords: Cooperative game theory, compromise admissible games, bankruptcy, core cover, complexity
File-Url: https://papers.tinbergen.nl/12012.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 635286 bytes
Handle: RePEc:tin:wpaper:20120012