Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers
Creation-Date: 2012-03-01
Number: 12-019/1
Author-Name: Pascal Billand
Author-Workplace-Name: Universite de Lyon, Universite Jean Monnet, Saint-Etienne, CNRS, GATE
Author-Name: Christophe Bravard
Author-Workplace-Name: Universite de Lyon, Universite Jean Monnet, Saint-Etienne, CNRS, GATE
Author-Name: Jurjen Kamphorst
Author-Workplace-Name: Erasmus University Rotterdam
Author-Name: Sudipta Sarangi
Author-Workplace-Name: DIW Berlin and Louisiana State University
Title: Confirming Information Flows in Networks
Abstract: Social networks, be it on the internet or in real life, facilitate information flows. We model this by giving agents incentives to link with others and receive information through those links. In many networks agents will value confirmation of the information they receive from others. Our paper analyzes the impact such a need for confirmation has on the social networks which are formed. We first study the existence of Nash equilibria and then characterize the set of strict Nash networks. Next, we characterize the set of strictly efficient networks and discuss the relationship between strictly efficient networks and strict Nash networks.
Classification-JEL: C72, D85
Keywords: connections model, confirmation, two-way flow models
File-Url: https://papers.tinbergen.nl/12019.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 450864 bytes
Handle: RePEc:tin:wpaper:20120019