Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers
Creation-Date: 2012-04-13
Number: 12-038/1
Author-Name: Roel van Veldhuizen
Author-Email: r.r.vanveldhuizen@uva.nl
Author-Workplace-Name: University of Amsterdam
Title: The Influence of Wages on Public Officials' Corruptibility: A Laboratory Investigation
Abstract: Previous studies have proposed a link between corruption and wages in the public sector. This paper investigates this link using a laboratory experiment. In the experiment, public officials have the opportunity to accept a bribe and can then decide between a neutral and a corrupt action. The corrupt action benefits the briber but poses a large negative externality on a charity. The results show that increasing public officials' wages greatly reduces their corruptibility. In particular, experienced low wage public officials accept 91% of bribes on average, whereas high wage public officials accept 38%. Moreover, high wage public officials are less likely to choose the corrupt option.
Classification-JEL: D73, C91, K42
Keywords: bribery, corruption, experimental economics, laboratory experiment
File-Url: https://papers.tinbergen.nl/12038.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 438176 bytes
Handle: RePEc:tin:wpaper:20120038