Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers
Creation-Date: 2012-07-20
Number: 12-077/1
Author-Name: John Morgan
Author-Workplace-Name: University of California, Berkeley
Author-Name: Dana Sisak
Author-Workplace-Name: Erasmus University Rotterdam
Author-Name: Felix Vardy
Author-Workplace-Name: University of California, Berkeley and IMF
Title: On the Merits of Meritocracy
Abstract: We study career choice when competition for promotion is a contest. A more meritocratic profession always succeeds in attracting the highest ability types, whereas a profession with superior promotion benefits attracts high types only if the hazard rate of the noise in performance evaluation is strictly increasing. Raising promotion opportunities produces no systematic effect on the talent distribution, while a higher base wage attracts talent only if total promotion opportunities are sufficiently plentiful.
Classification-JEL: J45, J24, M52
Keywords: career choice, promotion competition, selection, meritocracy
File-Url: https://papers.tinbergen.nl/12077.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 313932 bytes
Handle: RePEc:tin:wpaper:20120077