Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers
Creation-Date: 2012-09-14
Number: 12-094/IV/DSF38
Author-Name: Ali Akyol
Author-Workplace-Name: University of Melbourne
Author-Name: Konrad Raff
Author-Workplace-Name: VU University Amsterdam
Author-Name: Patrick Verwijmeren
Author-Workplace-Name: VU University Amsterdam, Duisenberg school of finance, and University of Glasgow
Title: The Elimination of Broker Voting in Director Elections
Abstract: After pressure from shareholder activists, proxy advisory firms, and the New York Stock Exchange, the Securities and Exchange Commission has eliminated uninstructed broker voting in director elections. We observe that average director approval rates remain high after the change in regulation, while the probability of a director being voted off the board remains low. In addition, we find no evidence of significant wealth effects of the change in regulation. We do find that firms are increasingly letting shareholders ratify their auditors after the change in regulation, which helps in establishing a quorum.
Classification-JEL: G34; G38
Keywords: Broker voting, shareholder empowerment, Securities and Exchange Commission, board effectiveness
File-Url: https://papers.tinbergen.nl/12094.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 364769 bytes
Handle: RePEc:tin:wpaper:20120094