Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers
Creation-Date: 2012-12-07
Number: 12-136/II
Author-Name: Rene van den Brink
Author-Workplace-Name: VU University Amsterdam
Author-Name: Youngsub Chun
Author-Workplace-Name: Seoul National University
Author-Name: Yukihiko Funaki
Author-Workplace-Name: Waseda University
Author-Name: Boram Park
Author-Workplace-Name: Rutgers University
Title: Consistency, Population Solidarity, and Egalitarian Solutions for TU-Games
Abstract: A (point-valued) solution for cooperative games with transferable utility, or simply TU-games, assigns a payoff vector to every TU-game. In this paper we discuss two classes of equal surplus sharing solutions, one consisting of all convex combinations of the equal division solution and the CIS-value, and its dual class consisting of all convex combinations of the equal division solution and the ENSC-value. We provide several characterizations using either population solidarity or a reduced game consistency in addition to other standard properties.
Classification-JEL: C71
Keywords: TU-game, equal division solution, CIS-value, ENSC-value, population solidarity, consistency
File-Url: https://papers.tinbergen.nl/12136.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 367795 bytes
Handle: RePEc:tin:wpaper:20120136