Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers
Creation-Date: 2013-03-15
Number: 13-045/II
Author-Name: Jeroen Hinloopen
Author-Workplace-Name: University of Amsterdam
Author-Name: Grega Smrkolj
Author-Workplace-Name: University of Amsterdam
Author-Name: Florian Wagener
Author-Workplace-Name: University of Amsterdam
Title: In Defense of Trusts: R&D Cooperation in Global Perspective
Abstract: We present a continuous-time generalization of the seminal R&D model of d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (American Economic Review, Vol. 78, No. 5) to examine the trade-off between the benefits of allowing firms to cooperate in R&D and the corresponding increased potential for product market collusion. We consider all trajectories that are candidates for an optimal solution as well as initial marginal cost levels that exceed the choke price. Firms
that collude develop further a wider range of initial technologies, pursue innovations more quickly, and are less likely to abandon a technology. Product market collusion could thus yield higher total surplus.
Classification-JEL: D43, D92, L13, L41, O31, O38
Keywords: Antitrust policy, Bifurcations, Collusion, R&D cooperatives, Spillovers
File-Url: https://papers.tinbergen.nl/13045.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 869956 bytes
Handle: RePEc:tin:wpaper:20130045