Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers
Creation-Date: 2013-07-19
Number: 13-096/VII
Author-Name: Sabien Dobbelaere
Author-Workplace-Name: VU University Amsterdam, the Netherlands, and IZA, Germany
Author-Name: Roland Iwan Luttens
Author-Workplace-Name: VU University Amsterdam, and Amsterdam University College, the Netherlands
Title: The Economics of First-Contract Mediation
Abstract: This paper provides an economic foundation for non-binding mediation to stimulate first collective bargaining agreements, as implemented in British Columbia since 1993. We show that the outcome of first-contract mediation is Pareto efficient and proves immune to the insider-outsider problem of underhiring. We also demonstrate that equilibrium wages and profits under mediation coincide with the Owen values of the corresponding cooperative game with the coalitional structure that follows from unionization.
Classification-JEL: C71, J51, L20, K12
Keywords: BC first-contract model, mediation, collective bargaining, union, non-binding contract
File-Url: https://papers.tinbergen.nl/13096.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 226449 bytes
Handle: RePEc:tin:wpaper:20130096