Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers
Creation-Date: 2015-07-06
Number: 15-080/II
Author-Name: Yuyu Zeng
Author-Workplace-Name: VU University Amsterdam, the Netherlands
Author-Name: Harold Houba
Author-Workplace-Name: VU University Amsterdam, the Netherlands
Author-Name: Gerard van der Laan
Author-Workplace-Name: VU University Amsterdam, the Netherlands
Title: Note on ‘Competition in Two-sided Markets’
Abstract: We extend the models in ("Competition in two-sided markets" of Armstrong (2006, <I>Rand Journal of Economics</I>) by adding within-group externalities. In the monopoly and duopoly cases, positive within-group externalities reduce the price of the own group. Negative externalities have an opposite price effect. In the case of a competitive bottleneck, we show by examples that within a certain range of parameter values, a novel phenomenon arises that the platform attracts more agents from one of the groups compared with the social optimum.
Classification-JEL: D4, L4
Keywords: Competition economics, two-sided market
File-Url: https://papers.tinbergen.nl/15080.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 337965 bytes
Handle: RePEc:tin:wpaper:20150080