Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers
Creation-Date: 2015-11-02
Number: 15-123/II
Author-Name: A. Estévez-Fernández
Author-Workplace-Name: VU University Amsterdam, the Netherlands
Author-Name: P. Borm
Author-Workplace-Name: Tilburg University, the Netherlands
Author-Name: M.G. Fiestras-Janeiro
Author-Workplace-Name: Universidade de Vigo, Spain
Author-Name: M.A. Mosquera
Author-Workplace-Name: Universidade de Vigo, Spain
Author-Name: E. Sánchez-Rodríguez
Author-Workplace-Name: Universidade de Vigo, Spain
Title: On the 1-Nucleolus for Classes of Cooperative Games
Abstract: This paper analyzes the 1-nucleolus and, in particular, its relation to the nucleolus and compromise value. It is seen that the 1-nucleolus of a cooperative game can be characterized using a combination of standard bankruptcy rules for associated bankruptcy problems. In particular, for any zero-normalized balanced game, the 1-nucleolus coincides with the Aumann-Maschler rule (Aumann and Maschler, 1985} in this sense. From this result, not only necessary conditions on a compromise stable game are derived such that the 1-nucleolus and the nucleolus coincide, but also necessary and sufficient conditions such that the 1-nucleolus and the compromise value of exact games coincide.
Classification-JEL: C71
Keywords: 1-nucleolus, Compromise stable games, Exact games, Aumann-Maschler rule, Nucleolus, Compromise value
File-Url: https://papers.tinbergen.nl/15123.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 160795 bytes
Handle: RePEc:tin:wpaper:20150123