Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers
Creation-Date: 2017-06-20
Revision-Date: 2017-07-07
Number: 17-053/VII
Author-Name: Olivier Bos
Author-Email: olivier.bos@u-paris2.fr
Author-Name: Francisco Gomez-Martinez
Author-Email: fragomez@eco.uc3m.es
Author-Workplace-Name: Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Spain
Author-Name: Sander Onderstal
Author-Email: onderstal@uva.nl
Author-Workplace-Name: University of Amsterdam and Tinbergen Institute, The Netherlands
Author-Name: Tom Truyts
Author-Email: tom.truyts@usaintlouis.be
Author-Workplace-Name: Saint-Louis University Brussels and University of Leuven, Belgium
Title: Signaling in Auctions: Experimental Evidence
Abstract: We study the relative performance of the first-price sealed-bid auction and the second-price sealed-bid auction in a laboratory experiment where bidders can signal information through their bidding behavior to an outside observer. We consider two different information settings: the auctioneer reveals either the identity of the winning bidder only, or she also reveals the winner’s payment to an outside observer. We find that the first-price sealed-bid auction in which the winner’s payment is revealed outperforms the other mechanisms in terms of revenue and efficiency. Our findings may have implications for the design of charity auctions, art auctions, and spectrum auctions.
Classification-JEL: C92; D44; D82
Keywords: Auctions; Signaling; Experiments
File-Url: https://papers.tinbergen.nl/17053.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 1061441 bytes
Handle: RePEc:tin:wpaper:20170053