Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers
Creation-Date: 2019-01-27
Revision-Date: 2020-06-31
Number: 19-009/VII
Author-Name: Jeroen (J.) Hinloopen
Author-Email: J.Hinloopen@uva.nl
Author-Workplace-Name: University of Amsterdam; CPB
Author-Name: Sander (A.M.) Onderstal
Author-Email: onderstal@uva.nl
Author-Workplace-Name: University of Amsterdam
Author-Name: Leonard Treuren
Author-Email: l.m.treuren@uva.nl
Author-Workplace-Name: University of Amsterdam
Title: Cartel stability in experimental first-price sealed-bid and English auctions
Abstract: Using laboratory experiments, we compare the stability of bidding rings in the English auction and the first-price sealed-bid auction in a heterogeneous-value setting. In both a re-matching condition and a fixed-matching condition, we observe that biddings rings are more stable in the English auction than in the first-price sealed-bid auction. In both conditions, the first-price sealed-bid auction dominates the English auction in terms of average revenue and the revenue spread. The English auction outperforms the first-price sealed-bid auction in terms of efficiency.
Classification-JEL: C92; D44; L41
Keywords: Cartel stability; English auction; First-price sealed-bid auction; Laboratory experiments
File-URL: https://papers.tinbergen.nl/19009.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 1363890 bytes
Handle: RePEc:tin:wpaper:20190009