Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers
Creation-Date: 2019-06-29
Number: 19-045/VII
Author-Name: Josse Delfgaauw
Author-Workplace-Name: Erasmus University Rotterdam
Author-Name: Robert Dur
Author-Workplace-Name: Erasmus University Rotterdam
Author-Name: Okemena Onemu
Author-Workplace-Name: Leiden University
Author-Name: Joeri Sol
Author-Workplace-Name: University of Amsterdam
Title: Team Incentives, Social Cohesion, and Performance: A Natural Field Experiment
Abstract: We conduct a field experiment in a Dutch retail chain with 122 stores to study the interaction between team incentives, team social cohesion, and team performance. Theory predicts that the effect of team incentives on team performance depends on a team's social cohesion. In particular, free-riding should be weaker when co-workers care more about each other. Conversely, team incentives may lead to more co-worker support or to higher peer pressure and thereby can affect the team's social cohesion. We introduce short-term team incentives in a randomly selected subset of stores and measure for all stores, both before and after the intervention, the team's sales performance, the team's social cohesion as well as co-worker support and peer pressure. The average treatment effect of the team incentive on sales is 1.5 percentage points, which does not differ significantly from zero. In line with theory, the estimated treatment effect strongly increases in social cohesion as measured before the intervention. We find that social cohesion itself is not affected by the team incentives. Our study illustrates the potential of complementing a field experiment with ex ante and ex post questionnaire data collection for the study of management practices, workplace behavior, and performance.
Classification-JEL: C93, M52
Keywords: field experiment, team incentives, social cohesion
File-URL: https://papers.tinbergen.nl/19045.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 1942302 bytes
Handle: RePEc:tin:wpaper:20190045