Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers
Creation-Date: 2019-10-04
Number: 19-071/I
Author-Name: Shaul Shalvi
Author-Workplace-Name: University of Amsterdam
Author-Name: Ivan Soraperra
Author-Workplace-Name: University of Amsterdam
Author-Name: Joël van der Weele
Author-Workplace-Name: University of Amsterdam
Author-Name: Marie Claire Villeval
Author-Workplace-Name: University of Lyon
Title: Shooting the Messenger? Supply and Demand in Markets for Willful Ignorance
Abstract: We investigate the role of advisers in the transmission of ethically relevant information, a critical aspect of executive decision making in organizations. In our laboratory experiment, advisers are informed about the negative externalities associated with the decision-maker's choices and compete with other advisers. We find that advisers suppress about a quarter of "inconvenient'' information. Suppression is not strategic, but based on the advisers' own preferences in the ethical dilemma. On the demand side, a substantial minority of decision makers avoid advisers who transmit inconvenient information (they "shoot the messenger''). Overall, by facilitating assortative matching, a competitive market for advisers efficiently caters to the demand for both information and information avoidance. Decision-makers are less likely to implement their preferred option when they are randomly matched to advisers and there is no scope for assortative matching.
Classification-JEL: D91, C91, D83, D82
Keywords: Self-deception, information avoidance, unethical behavior, experiment
File-URL: https://papers.tinbergen.nl/19071.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 2398358 bytes
Handle: RePEc:tin:wpaper:20190071