Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers
Creation-Date: 2020-06-20
Revision-Date: 2020-12-14
Number: 20-034/VII
Author-Name: Samuel Hoey
Author-Workplace-Name: Erasmus School of Economics
Author-Name: Thomas Peeters
Author-Workplace-Name: Erasmus School of Economics
Author-Name: Francesco Principe
Author-Workplace-Name: Erasmus School of Economics
Title: The transfer system in European football: a pro-competitive no-poaching agreement?	
Abstract: We assess the proclaimed pro-competitive effects of the “transfer system”, the no-poaching agreement governing the European football (soccer) labor market. A major argument to legitimize this system is that transfer fees, which hiring clubs pay to release players from their current clubs, redistribute revenues from large market to small market clubs. This would strengthen small clubs’ financial clout and their ability to compete in sporting terms. Player transfer fees represent over 10 billion Euros in asset value in the financial statements of the 202 clubs we analyze. Still, small market clubs rarely obtain substantial revenues from the transfer market. The main beneficiaries are clubs around the middle of the market size distribution. A select group of large market clubs makes significant transfer losses, but this does not undo their initial financial advantage. Overall, the transfer system therefore leads to a very minor reduction in revenue inequality.
Classification-JEL: L41, J41, K12, L83
Keywords: no-poaching, antitrust, revenue redistribution, transfer system, European football
File-URL: https://papers.tinbergen.nl/20034.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 1751391 bytes
Handle: RePEc:tin:wpaper:20200034