Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers
Creation-Date: 2023-02-03
Revision-Date: 2023-11-30
Number: 23-010/V
Author-Name: Mylène Lagarde
Author-Workplace-Name: London School of Economics and Political Science
Author-Name: Carlos Riumallo Herl
Author-Workplace-Name: Erasmus University Rotterdam 
Title: Better together? Group incentives and the demand for prevention
Abstract: We study the power of combining small financial incentives and social dynamics. In a field experiment in El Salvador, we compare the impact of group incentives to equivalent individual ones to increase uptake of a health check-up. Despite the uncertainty about others’ behavior, group incentives are at least as effective as individual ones, thanks to increased communication and collective action between members as well as peer pressure to a lesser extent. Because payment is only made if all members comply, collective incentives prove more cost-effective and appear valuable strategies to overcome financial and behavioral barriers that limit investment in health.
Classification-JEL: C93, D91, I12
Keywords: 
ExperimentFile-URL: https://papers.tinbergen.nl/23010.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size:1.009.882 bytes
Handle: RePEc:tin:wpaper:20230010