Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers
Creation-Date: 2024-03-26
Number: 24-021/II
Author-Name: Zhengxing Zou
Author-Workplace-Name: Beijing Jiaotong University and University of Toronto
Author-Name: René van den Brink
Author-Workplace-Name: Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam 
Author-Name: Yukihiko Funaki
Author-Workplace-Name: Waseda University
Title: On weighted-egalitarian values for cooperative games
Abstract: We propose and characterize weighted-egalitarian values for cooperative transferable utility games. Each weighted-egalitarian value divides the worth of the grand coalition into two parts and allocates them through equality and proportionality based on exogenous player weights. We characterize the family of all weighted-egalitarian values by employing the standard axioms of efficiency and linearity, in addition to two novel axioms: ω-ratio invariance for symmetric players and symmetry in weights. We then show that relaxing linearity to additivity and adding coalitional monotonicity results in a sub- family of affine combinations of equal division and weighted division values. Furthermore, using an axiom called monotonicity in weights, we characterize the family of convex combinations of equal division and weighted division values.
Classification-JEL: C71
Keywords: cooperative game, axiomatization, equal division value, weighted division value, equality
File-URL: https://papers.tinbergen.nl/24021.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 418.119 bytes
Handle: RePEc:tin:wpaper:20240021