Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers
Creation-Date: 2024-12-20
Number: 24-076/II
Author-Name: Rene van den Brink
Author-Workplace-Name: Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam and Tinbergen Institute
Author-Name: Dinko Dimitrov
Author-Workplace-Name: Saarland University
Author-Name: Agnieszka Rusinowska
Author-Workplace-Name: Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne, CNRS
Title: Power in plurality games
Abstract: Simple games in partition function form are used to model voting situations where a coalition being winning or losing might depend on the way players outside that coalition organize themselves. Such a game is called a plurality voting game if in every partition there is at least one winning coalition. In the present paper, we introduce a power index for this class of voting games and provide an axiomatic characterization. This power index is based on equal weight for every partition, equal weight for every winning coalition in a partition, and equal weight for each player in a winning coalition. Since some of the axioms we develop are conditioned on the power impact of losing coalitions becoming winning in a partition, our characterization heavily depends on a new result showing the existence of such elementary transitions between plurality voting games in terms of single embedded winning coalitions. The axioms restrict then the impact of such elementary transitions on the power of different types of players.
Classification-JEL: C71, D62, D72
Keywords: axiomatization; power index; plurality game; winning coalition
File-URL: https://papers.tinbergen.nl/24076.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 315.925 bytes
Handle: RePEc:tin:wpaper:20240076