Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers
Creation-Date: 2025-11-27
Number: 25-066/V
Author-Name: Hessel Oosterbeek
Author-Workplace-Name: University of Amsterdam
Author-Name: Tina Rozsos
Author-Workplace-Name: Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
Author-Name: Bas van der Klaauw
Author-Workplace-Name: Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
Title: School choice, school switching, and optimal assignment
Abstract: Close to 20% of secondary school students in Amsterdam - and elsewhere - transfer between secondary schools at some point, even when initially placed in their most-preferred school. School switching is costly for the students involved and disrupts the learning environment of their former and new classmates. Using data from the Amsterdam secondary-school match linked to administrative registers, we show that switching can be predicted by hard-to-rationalize initial school choices. Over 60% of switchers can be correctly identified at the admission stage. Simulations indicate that encouraging predicted switchers to adjust their preference ranking of schools could reduce the switching rate by almost 15%.
Classification-JEL: C35, C53, I21
Keywords: secondary education, school choice, school switching, admission lottery
File-URL: https://papers.tinbergen.nl/25066.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 2.430.421 bytes
Handle: RePEc:tin:wpaper:20250066