Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers
Creation-Date: 2026-02-26
Number: 26-008/VII
Author-Name: Eric Bartelsman
Author-Workplace-Name: Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
Author-Name: Sabien Dobbelaere 
Author-Workplace-Name: Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
Author-Name: Alessandro Zona Mattioli 
Author-Workplace-Name: University of Amsterdam
Title: Intangible Assets and Imperfections in Product and Labor Markets
Abstract: This paper develops a micro-founded framework linking price-cost and wage markups to intangible assets. Intangible assets, once created, are a source of firm rents. Owing to limits to enforceable ownership and the non-rival nature of knowledge, these rents can be both retained by the origin firm and transferred to a competitor through poaching of workers. Search and matching frictions affect labor mobility and result in bargaining over rents between the firm and the worker. This environment generates hold-up in intangible asset creation and motivates rent sharing.  Under non-compete agreements, poached workers face start delays that weaken outside options. Using microdata from the Netherlands, we document higher price-cost and wage markups in more intangible-intensive firms and lower wages for workers with non-compete agreements, consistent with the model.
Classification-JEL: J41, L10, O30
Keywords: Price-cost markups, wage markups, rent sharing, intangibles, non-compete agreements
File-URL: https://papers.tinbergen.nl/26008.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 1.299.684 bytes
Handle: RePEc:tin:wpaper:20260008