Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers
Creation-Date: 2026-09-13
Number: 26-069/IV
Author-Name: Yackolley Amoussou-Guenou
Author-Workplace-Name: Université Paris-Panthéon-Assas
Author-Name: Maarten R.C. van Oordt
Author-Workplace-Name: Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
Title: Blockchains and Strategic Secondary Censorship
Abstract: Censorship resistance is often considered to be a core attribute of distributed ledgers. Censorship resistance refers to the inability to selectively exclude technically valid but undesirable transactions from the blockchain. We examine blockchain censorship in a game-theoretic framework that allows for both primary and secondary censorship. The analysis identifies scenarios in which both inclusion and censorship equilibria exist. Once an equilibrium with strategic secondary censorship is implemented, it may be hard to revert to inclusion: Censorship equilibria are perfectly coalition-proof if the negative impact of an undesirable transaction on block producers is sufficiently large. These results highlight the growing importance of research into methods shaping  censorship resistance at the technical layer.
Classification-JEL: C72, G2, L86
Keywords: Blockchain, Consensus, Cryptocurrency, Distributed ledger, Game theory
File-URL: https://papers.tinbergen.nl/26069.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 1.256.155 bytes
Handle: RePEc:tin:wpaper:20260069