Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers
Creation-Date: 2026-10-05
Number: 26-076/VII
Author-Name: Lotte Swank
Author-Workplace-Name: University of Groningen
Author-Name: Otto Swank
Author-Workplace-Name: Erasmus University Rotterdam
Author-Name: Joes de Natris
Author-Workplace-Name: Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Title: Representation over Rents: The Broad-Coalition Norm in Dutch Local Politics
Abstract: In multi-party parliamentary democracies, governments emerge from post-election bargaining. We study coalition formation in Dutch municipalities. Bargaining models and a norm that "the largest party should govern" predict that party rank affects coalition formation. Using regression discontinuity designs, we find no causal effect of party rank on coalition inclusion. Instead, governments follow a broad-coalition logic: when two parties jointly win a narrow majority, they nevertheless include a third party in 95\% of cases. Parties that participate in coalitions excluding a relatively large party are less likely to enter the next coalition, consistent with dynamic penalties for violating a broad-coalition norm.
Classification-JEL: 
Keywords: Coalition formation, Bargaining models, Regression Discontinuity Design, Democratic norms
File-URL: https://papers.tinbergen.nl/26076.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 1.599.389 bytes
Handle: RePEc:tin:wpaper:20260076