Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers Creation-Date: 1997-02-10 Number: 97-023/1 Author-Name: Robert A.J. Dur Author-Email: dur@few.eur.nl Author-Workplace-Name: Erasmus University Rotterdam Author-Name: Otto H. Swank Author-Email: swank@few.eur.nl Author-Workplace-Name: Erasmus University Rotterdam Title: On the Role of the Governmental Agreement in Breaking Political Deadlocks Abstract: This discussion paper resulted in a publication in the 'European Journal of Political Economy', 1998, 14(3), 561-572.

Resistance to socially desired reforms may arise from uncertainty about the consequences of reforms at the individual level (Fernandez and Rodrik, 1991). Without a binding commitment, a promise to compensate losers will not raise support for reforms due to a credibility problem. This paper shows that voting simultaneously on several reforms may solve the credibility problem. It is argued that the governmental agreement in the Netherlands has served as a means to vote simultaneously on several reforms and has helped breaking political deadlocks. Moreover, our model provides an explanation for some perceived changes in the Dutch policy making process. Classification-JEL: D78 Keywords: Policy reform; Credibility; Government formation; Voting behaviour, Mid-term cycle File-Url: https://papers.tinbergen.nl/97023.pdf File-Format: application/pdf File-Size: 94351 bytes Handle: RePEc:tin:wpaper:19970023