Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers
Creation-Date: 1997-07-03
Number: 97-073/1
Author-Name: Maarten C.W. Janssen
Author-Workplace-Name: University of Vienna, Austria
Author-Name: Emiel Maasland
Author-Workplace-Name: Erasmus University Rotterdam, the Netherlands
Title: On the Unique D1 Equilibrium in the Stackelberg Model with Asymmetric Information
Abstract: This note studies a version of the Stackelberg model in which the Leader has more information aboutdemand than the Follower. We show that there exists a unique D1 equilibrium and that this equilibriumis perfectly revealing. We also give a full characterization of the equilibrium in terms of the posteriorbeliefs of the Follower and show under which condition there is first mover disadvantage.
File-Url: https://papers.tinbergen.nl/97073.pdf
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Handle: RePEc:tin:wpaper:19970073