Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers
Creation-Date: 1997-11-21
Number: 97-116/1
Author-Name: Theo Offerman
Author-Email: t.j.s.offerman@uva.nl
Author-Name: Jan Potters
Author-Workplace-Name: University of Amsterdam
Author-Name: Joep Sonnemans
Author-Email: j.h.sonnemans@uva.nl
Author-Workplace-Name: Tilburg University
Title: Imitation and Belief Learning in an Oligopoly Experiment
Abstract: We examine the force of three types of behavioral dynamics in quantity-setting triopoly experiments:mimicking the successful firm,following the exemplary firm, andbelief learning.Theoretically, these three rules of dynamic conduct lead to the competitive, the collusive, and the Cournot-Nash outcome, respectively. In the experiment we employ three information treatments. Each of these treatments is hypothesized to be conducive to the force of one of the three dynamic rules. To a large extent, the results are consistent with the hypothesized relationships between treatments, dynamic rules, and outcomes.
Classification-JEL: H41; C91
Keywords: quantity-setting oligopoly game; imitation; belief learning; experiments
File-Url: https://papers.tinbergen.nl/97116.pdf
File-Format: application/pdf
File-Size: 557738 bytes
Handle: RePEc:tin:wpaper:19970116