Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers
Creation-Date: 1999-06-11
Number: 99-043/1
Author-Name: Akira Okada
Author-Workplace-Name: Kyoto University
Author-Name: Arno Riedl
Author-Email: a.m.riedl@uva.nl
Author-Workplace-Name: CREED, University of Amsterdam
Title: When Culture does not matter: Experimental Evidence from Coalition Formation Ultimatum Games in Austria and Japan
Abstract: This paper reports the results of a cross-country comparison between Austria andJapan for an experimental 3-personcoalition formation ultimatum game. The experimental design allows thecomparison with respect to three decisions. (i)The coalition decision, (ii) proposers' demand behavior in 2- and 3-personultimatum subgames, and (iii) theresponders' behavior in these subgames. In contrast to other cross-culturalstudies in experimental bargainingenvironments we can not find any (significant) difference in behavior betweensubjects in Austria and Japan. Weattribute the behavioral similarities mainly to a subtle focal point andresponder competition effect, which wipe outpossible cultural differences. Our conclusion is that even in environments -like bargaining - where cultural differencesmay play a prominent role the show-up of these differences is highly sensitiveto the exact context in which people act.
File-Url: https://papers.tinbergen.nl/99043.pdf
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Handle: RePEc:tin:wpaper:19990043